Narrative Theory in Light of Contemporary Narrative Practice by Dieter, Scott
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Narrative Theory in Light of Contemporary Narrative Practice 
 
Honors Research Thesis 
 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with honors research 
distinction in English in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University 
 
by 
 
Scott Dieter 
 
The Ohio State University 
May 2011 
 
Project Advisor: Professor David Herman, Department of English 
  
  Dieter 2 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the corpus of stories being investigated by scholars of narrative 
has grown to include a wide range of genres and media.  Instead of focusing solely on 
monomodal print texts, scholars have opened up the discussion of narrative theory to 
include films, video games, and graphic novels.  Narratives themselves have also 
continued to evolve, providing new challenges for narrative theorists. 
As the corpus of narratives expands, existing theories of narrative must be 
revisited and in some cases modified to account for new narrative phenomena.  The goal 
of my project is to show how contemporary work in narrative theory helps to enrich our 
understanding of three contemporary examples of experimental storytelling—Ian 
McEwan’s Atonement, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, and Alison Bechdel’s Fun 
Home—but also how these three case studies generate new questions about narrative and 
invite us to revisit and expand existing frameworks for the study of stories.  My project is 
divided into three chapters, which deal with three different aspects of narrative and 
narrative interpretation: intertextuality, rereading and reader response, and fictional and 
factual worlds.  Further, because Bechdel's text is a graphic memoir, my study also 
considers how issues of medium specificity affect concepts developed by theorists of 
narrative. 
In my first chapter, I consider questions of intertextuality, focusing specifically on 
Christian Moraru’s concept of the postmodern rewrite.  Moraru defines the postmodern 
rewrite as a narrative that rewrites a single text in an obvious way in service of a larger 
ideological critique.  I argue that each of my three case studies acts as a postmodern 
rewrite in a way that Moraru’s framework does not account for.  Because Fun Home is a 
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multimodal narrative, for example, it is able to rewrite several texts with a higher degree 
of narrative economy than would be possible in a print text.  Atonement, on the other 
hand, rewrites the entire modernist tradition by shifting from an epistemological 
dominant to an ontological dominant.  Similarly, Never Let Me Go rewrites classic 
dystopian fiction by subverting its common tropes in the service of a larger social 
critique. 
In my second chapter, I argue that the models of configuration and 
reconfiguration laid out by James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz must be expanded to 
consider how the process of rereading differs from that of an initial reading.  Narratives 
with surprise endings, I contend, illustrate this difference especially well.  Drawing on 
Phelan’s argument that surprise endings can only be effective if they are prepared for 
throughout the narrative, I argue that the process of rereading such narratives involves a 
dialogue between the rereader and his or her first-time-reading self, in that the rereader 
looks for clues that he or she missed in his or her initial reading.  I also contend that the 
process of rereading invites the reader to reconfigure his or her judgments of the narrator.  
Finally, in my third chapter, I draw on the work of Dorrit Cohn, Marie-Laure 
Ryan, and Lubomír Doležel, arguing that each of my three case studies presents a unique 
area of overlap between fictional and factual narrative that these scholars’ frameworks do 
not account for.  Fun Home, for instance, complicates Cohn’s distinction between factual 
biography and third-person fiction through its use of fictional analogues in narrating the 
lives of actual persons.  In my discussion of Atonement, I argue that Ryan’s concept of 
fictional recentering must be expanded to consider instances of recentering that are 
hidden from the reader; I call this unique type of recentering “embedded recentering.”  
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Finally, I argue that the counterfactual history contained in Never Let Me Go challenges 
Doležel’s distinction between the historian’s counterfactual history and the fiction 
maker’s counterfactual history.  While Doležel contends that the fiction maker’s 
counterfactual history always functions as a postmodernist parody, I argue that Ishiguro 
uses his counterfactual history in Never Let Me Go as a thought experiment--thus 
undercutting Doležel’s account of the uses and effects of counterfactual history itself. 
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Chapter 1: Intertextuality 
Over the past several decades, theorists of literature, culture, and language have 
developed different ways of understanding intertextuality, or the way a given text relates 
to a larger constellation of texts.  Some of these accounts—especially those of the 
Russian Formalists and structuralist narratologists—are staggeringly broad, casting 
intertextuality as a universal feature of all literary works. Other accounts, however, are 
more restrictive, using as a criterion for intertextuality the actual presence of one text in 
another text.  Some theorists argue that postmodernist texts feature their own unique 
brand of limited intertextuality; in fact, some scholars contend that the extensive use of 
intertextuality is one of postmodernism’s defining characteristics  (Moraru, 
“Intertextuality”).   
Christian Moraru has done important work on concepts of postmodern 
intertextuality, particularly in connection with the genre of the postmodern rewrite.  
According to Moraru, for a text to qualify as a postmodern rewrite, the rewriting must be 
“there in various degrees of obviousness” (“Rewriting” 19, his italics).  In other words, 
the analysis of the presence of the rewritten text in the rewrite should not depend on 
“constitutive judgment,” as Genette calls it (“Palimpsests” 9); its presence should be 
obvious without the reader having to make a case for it.  More importantly, there must 
exist “a ‘rupture’ between [rewriters] and what they redo… as well as between 
themselves and various hegemonic forces active at the moment” (Moraru 9). Postmodern 
rewrites engage with and critique the ideology found in their source texts, often reframing 
the story from a perspective that is ideologically marginalized in the original (9).   
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This emphasis on an ideological reworking of the rewritten text sets Moraru’s 
model apart from other models of intertextuality, and also makes it productive for the 
analysis of postmodern texts, many of which use earlier works both as scaffolding for 
storytelling and as ideological artifacts subject to deconstruction. In this chapter, I argue 
that the authors of each of my three case studies engage in acts of postmodern rewriting, 
but do so in such a way that invites us to expand Moraru’s framework. 
Fun Home 
It is difficult to imagine a work more densely intertextual than Fun Home.  The 
complex network of literary allusions Bechdel creates is central to the work’s style as 
well as its narrative structure; at one point Bechdel herself admits that she “employ[s] 
these allusions to James and Fitzgerald not only as descriptive devices, but because my 
parents are most real to me in fictional terms” (67).  Bechdel tells her family’s story by 
telling other stories with which the reader, she assumes, is familiar.   
At the same time, this use of intertextuality is more than just a narrative device.  
In her essay “Drawing on Modernism in Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home,” Ariela Freedman 
argues that by “citing, revising, and challenging” these works, the bulk of which belong 
to the modernist tradition, Bechdel is “making a space for herself on the shelf of 
modernist literature” (126).  I contend, however, that the relationship of Fun Home to the 
modernist canon is more complicated than Freedman's remarks would suggest.  While 
Bechdel certainly situates Fun Home in dialogue with modernist literature, that dialogue 
involves critique and deconstructive dismantling to a degree that Freedman does not 
explicitly acknowledge.  In Moraru’s terms, Bechdel creates a “rupture” between Fun 
Home and the modernist canon (9).   
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In writing Fun Home as a graphic memoir, Bechdel has at her disposal a set of 
tools for this critical rewriting that are unique to the medium.  This set of tools is afforded 
by the multimodal nature of the graphic memoir – that is, its use of two semiotic 
“environments,” the verbal and the visual, as opposed to the single semiotic environment 
of a monomodal work, such as a novel (Herman 197; see also Kress and van Leeuwen). 
Bechdel spreads her intertextual references across each of these two modes, thereby 
complicating both the reader’s sense of that intertextuality as “obvious” and the relation 
of Bechdel’s narrative to the intertexts it invokes. 
Moraru notes that “[a] few intertexts, insufficiently developed or not pivotal 
enough to the work, do not make it a rewrite” (20).  In Fun Home, the relative importance 
of a given intertext is not always clear.  Certainly, it would be difficult to argue that 
Bechdel’s inclusion of a Hardy Boys novel in one panel of the memoir constitutes an 
entire rewrite of the Hardy Boys series (141).  At times, however, the works Bechdel 
conspicuously places in the visual track seem to have quite a bit to do with the Bechdel’s 
own narrative.  Freedman refers in particular to Bechdel’s inclusion of an image of Anna 
Karenina in a panel on the first page of the memoir; as Freedman notes, this visual 
quotation of Tolstoy's novel “foreshadows [Alison’s] father’s later suicide, and 
complicates the reference to Icarus” (131).  Likewise, Umberto Eco’s The Role of the 
Reader, visible on a library shelf in another panel (Bechdel 74), is certainly relevant to 
Fun Home, a work whose extensive network of intertextuality “assumes and constructs 
an erudite reader” (Pearl 287). Does this make Fun Home a rewrite of The Role of the 
Reader for the postmodern age?  Moraru would probably say not, given that this 
particular intertext is “insufficiently developed” (20) in the context of memoir as a whole.  
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What I wish to emphasize here, however, is that the multimodal nature of the narration 
allows for a sort of rewriting that is not possible in a monomodal text.  By visually 
referring to these intertexts while carrying on with self-narration in the verbal track, 
Bechdel literally rewrites the intertext by situating it in a multimodal environment and at 
the same allowing the narrative and other discourses conveyed by each mode to comment 
on one another. 
While Bechdel’s brief visual references to book titles enact this multimodal 
rewriting on a small scale, she also employs more extended and complex allusions 
involving the interplay between words and images.  In one instance, Bechdel tells the 
story of her parents’ marriage and subsequent trip to Paris, while simultaneously 
synopsizing Henry James’ The Portrait of a Lady.  In the verbal track, Bechdel relates 
James’ tale, with a brief interruption to explain verbally the circumstances of her parents’ 
trip.  In the visual track, Bechdel illustrates that trip.  Her synopsis itself is literally a 
rewrite, of course, but it is one that maintains the norms and values associated with the 
original text.  Thus when Bechdel describes Isabel Archer, the heroine of The Portrait of 
a Lady, to be “perverse” in her acceptance of Gilbert Osmond, a “culturally dissipated, 
and penniless European art collector,” she is transcribing how Isabel eventually comes to 
be seen in James’ original work (71). 
At the same time, however, Bechdel retells James’ story by drawing on events 
from her own life story, which she illustrates in the visual track.  In doing so, she draws 
out the tensions between her multimodal rewrite and the original text.  She begins with a 
drawing of her mother’s passport photograph, which a caption tells us is from before her 
marriage to Bruce.  The next frame shows Helen, Alison's mother, meeting Bruce at an 
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airport in Germany.  These frames correspond with the beginning of Bechdel’s synopsis, 
in which she describes Isabel leaving America for Europe and “perversely” accepting 
Gilbert Osmond (71).  In this instance, Bechdel's rewrite is a personal update of the 
original; she recasts the characters in her own story as characters in The Portrait.  The 
parallel continues as Bechdel tells (and shows) us that, eventually, both Isabel and Helen 
learn of their husbands’ affairs.  To conclude her rewrite of James, Bechdel includes a 
passport photograph of Helen from eight years later, using the visual track to highlight 
the effect that such an unhealthy marriage has on Helen.  Even as she draws out such 
parallels between James’ tale and her own, however, she critiques the ideology of The 
Portrait.  For example, while Gilbert’s affair is with the woman who introduced him to 
Isabel, Bruce’s affair is with a man.  Given the context of Fun Home as a whole, this 
reframes and complicates the storyline of The Portrait, in which Isabel is the victim in 
her relationship with Gilbert.  In this case, while Helen is still clearly victimized by 
Bruce’s violent and unfaithful behavior, Bechdel paints Bruce as a victim, as well, one 
whose less-than-laudable behavior may arise from his inability to come out as 
homosexual in an oppressive and homophobic world. In this way, in accordance with 
Moraru's account of postmodern rewrites, Bechdel does not merely engage explicitly 
with James' prior text, but also critiques the ideological structures with which the source 
text is more or less complicit. 
Bechdel makes further use of this technique in the memoir’s fourth chapter, which 
features an extended comparison of Bruce Bechdel and Marcel Proust.  In one particular 
scene, Bechdel illustrates her family digging up some trees from a local park to plant in 
their own backyard, where their babysitter Roy joins them (93).  In the verbal track, she 
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summarizes a passage from Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, describing how the 
narrator falls in love with a young girl who is indistinguishable from the surrounding 
flowers.  She follows up this summary with a discussion of Proust’s personal life and his 
relationships with young men.  With the juxtaposition of these two stories, Bechdel 
effectively retells the segment of Proust’s tale, replacing the narrator and the little girl 
with Bruce and Roy, respectively, while engaging in a Proustian comparison of Bruce’s 
love of Roy with his love of natural beauty.  Of course, we know that the circumstances 
of their relationship are not unproblematic – their relationship is clearly sexual, and Roy 
is a minor.  Indeed, Bechdel juxtaposes her own morally complex tale with Proust’s 
romanticized one to emphasize the voiceless, disempowered position of the fetishized 
characters in both stories.  
In Fun Home, then, Bechdel uses the graphic memoir’s multiple semiotic 
channels in order to engage with a multitude of intertexts with a greater degree of 
narrative economy than could be achieved in a monomodal account.  By including 
intertextual references (such as illustrations of books) in the visual track, while carrying 
on her own narration in the verbal track, Bechdel allows her narrative to comment on the 
intertexts, and vice versa.  Bechdel also uses the two semiotic channels to engage more 
extensively with certain intertexts, telling her own story in the visual track while 
rewriting an intertext in the verbal track.  This method allows Bechdel not only to draw 
out the parallels between the narratives, but also to subject the intertext to a process of 
ideological critique.  Ultimately, Fun Home engages in a kind of postmodern rewriting 
that Moraru’s framework does not account for, not only through its use of medium-
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specific techniques, but also in the way it complicates the question of the “obviousness” 
of a rewrite. 
Atonement 
Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey, a passage from which serves as the opening 
epigraph of Atonement, is only the first of many intertexts found in McEwan's novel.  It is 
not even the novel’s only reference to Austen, whose intertextual significance for 
Atonement has been discussed at length (see Hidalgo). Atonement is “a work of fiction 
that is from beginning to end concerned with the making of fiction” (Finney 69), and its 
concern with fiction is often manifested intertextually, as Briony, in developing her ever-
changing identity as a writer, shifts among various literary movements and practices. 
Briony’s initial attraction to and eventual rejection of the literary ideals of modernism are 
particularly relevant to my project here, as they constitute a certain kind of postmodern 
rewrite, albeit one that again (in a different way than Fun Home) complicates the 
boundaries of Moraru’s framework. 
As noted previously, Moraru’s concept of the postmodern rewrite is premised on 
a specific kind of intertextuality, one that is characterized by an obvious, one-to-one 
correspondence between two texts, with the rewrite in some way critiquing the rewritten 
text.  But despite extensive plot similarities with individual texts such as Austen’s 
Northanger Abbey and Woolf’s Jacob’s Room (see Hidalgo and D’Angelo), McEwan’s 
novel is not a direct rewrite of a single source, at least not in a way that is suggested by 
Moraru’s framework.  Instead, Atonement positions itself in relation to an intertext, or 
rather a cluster of intertexts, that stands somewhere between Moraru's conceptions of 
"universal" and "specific" intertextuality--that is, between the general condition of being 
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one text in a larger tradition of texts, on the one hand, and the making of targeted 
allusions to a particular precursor text, on the other hand.  In the case of Atonement, the 
cluster of intertexts by virtue of which McEwan's novel situates itself between these two 
poles of cross-textual reference is the cluster of narratives associated with modernist 
fiction.   
My suggestion is that, apart from being merely architextual, or of merely 
taxonomic or literary-historical significance (Genette, “Palimpsests” 4), Atonement's 
relationship to modernism also disrupts the simple dichotomy of general versus specific 
intertextuality.  The first three sections of the novel are in many ways a straightforward 
continuation of the modernist tradition, complete with fragmented perspectives and a 
focus on internal consciousness.  The novel’s epilogue, however, breaks from this 
traditional modernist aesthetic when it reveals that the reader has actually just finished 
Briony’s own novel, and that Briony has fabricated the ending.  Thus, by virtue of its 
larger structure, McEwan's text rewrites modernist fiction by unwriting it. 
The ending of Atonement has received much critical attention, and for good 
reason.  The revelation that Briony has been narrating and taking significant poetic 
license with the entire novel is decidedly jarring, and it also has numerous implications 
for the reader’s relationship to the novel.  Paul Crosthwaite compares how the novel’s 
ending affects readers with the way trauma affects war veterans: “The likely effects of 
these baleful revelations on a reader correspond in various ways to the temporal 
structure… of a traumatic episode” (63).  James Phelan focuses instead on the narrative 
judgments that the ending asks the reader to make, arguing that McEwan leads us to 
question our readiness to accept Briony’s romanticized version of the story (130). Despite 
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the difference in angles, Crosthwaite and Phelan, like most commentators on the novel, 
discuss Briony’s revelation as a sort of rupture in the text, one that retroactively alters 
what came before it.  Returning to Moraru’s framework, I argue that the rupture of 
Briony’s revelation also acts as a rupture in Moraru’s sense, creating a rift between the 
ultimately postmodern Atonement and the modernism it rewrites.   
The first three sections of Atonement are intertextual with modernism not just 
because they mention modernist and late-modernist writers such as Virginia Woolf and 
Elizabeth Bowen, but also because they exhibit an epistemological dominant--to use 
Brian McHale's terms.  In other words, these sections focus on questions of knowledge, a 
feature that separates modernist fiction from postmodernist fiction, which is primarily 
concerned with ontological issues, or questions about what is real versus imagined in the 
world of the narrative (McHale 9-11).  Alan Palmer summarizes the difference by 
articulating two questions, modernism’s being “How can we know reality?” and 
postmodernism’s being “What is reality?” (276).  The epistemological dominant of 
Atonement’s first three sections manifests itself in the levels of both story and discourse.  
That is to say, questions of knowledge are raised by the events of the story – most 
notably, by young Briony’s own writings – but also by the way that the story is told.  The 
first section, for instance, is told in fourteen chapters, and those chapters are focalized 
through a variety of characters.  While the temporal movement is largely chronological, 
the narrative is sometimes multiply focalized, doubling back to provide two or more 
perspectives on the same event.  This is the case in chapters two and three, both of which 
depict Robbie and Cecilia conversing by the fountain, where Robbie accidentally causes 
Cecilia to break a valuable family vase, and Cecilia gets into the fountain to retrieve the 
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broken piece.  In the first of these two chapters, the focalization alternates between 
Cecilia and Robbie, while the next chapter relates the scene as Briony witnessed it. This 
emphasis on perspective underscores the modernist preoccupation with how characters 
with different viewpoints come to experience and internalize the same reality in different 
ways.  Importantly, the reality itself appears stable and unified – it is the human 
perception of that reality which is fragmented. 
As previously noted, these epistemological also surface at the story level.  Indeed, 
the very scene by the fountain serves as a sort of “revelation” to Briony: “Now there was 
nothing left of the dumb show by the fountain beyond what survived in memory, in three 
separate and overlapping memories.  The truth had become as ghostly as invention… the 
scene could be recast, through Cecilia’s eyes, and then Robbie’s” (McEwan 52).  Here, 
the young Briony begins to realize the benefits of a modernist aesthetic.  Again, there 
exists a “truth” in her formulation, but the only access to that truth is through three 
differing perspectives.   
The novel's intertextual connections with modernist narratives come to the fore 
even more explicitly in the letter of rejection that Briony receives from Horizon.  In the 
letter, the magazine’s editor Cyril Connolly praises Briony’s potential as a writer, but 
suggests that she borrows a little too heavily from “Mrs. Woolf,” and that her novella 
lacks the “underlying pull of simple narrative” (McEwan 402).  Connolly then offers 
Briony some suggestions, proposing that instead of “dwell[ing] for quite so long on the 
perceptions of each of the three figures,” she might “create some tension, some light and 
shade within the narrative itself” (McEwan 404).  Connolly’s letter essentially serves as a 
discussion of the merits and drawbacks of the modernist aesthetic, or at least Briony’s 
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version of that aesthetic.  Indeed, given that Connolly equates Briony’s novella with the 
writings of Virginia Woolf, and attributes some of his own suggestions to Elizabeth 
Bowen, the letter seems to privilege one kind of modernism over another.  For McEwan, 
modernism is not a monolithic whole, but a temporally emergent phenomenon, and its 
later period, represented by Bowen, is already engaged in a rewriting of its earlier, “high” 
period, represented by Woolf.   
This explicit discussion of modernist fiction foregrounds the epistemological 
focus of the first three sections of the novel. But with Briony’s late revelation that she 
herself has narrated the previous sections of what we took to be a heterodiegetic fictional 
text comes an abrupt shift in dominant.  All of the sudden, the primary question is not 
whose version of events is most reliable, but whether those events actually took place at 
all.  What is most significant here, however, is that the epilogue does not pose a new set 
of epistemological questions, but instead changes the nature of the questions raised in the 
novel’s first three sections – questions articulated through both the discourse and the 
story levels of the novel.  The novel’s variable focalization, for instance, no longer 
represents an attempt to capture truth through a set of different yet overlapping 
perspectives.  With Briony proving to be the agent ultimately in control of the narration, 
the question now becomes: “Which of these events actually occurred?”  Alan Palmer 
makes this point when he discusses the several different Robbies present in the novel.  
Some of the Robbies in the novel, he argues, such as the one at Dunkirk represented in 
the novel’s second section, are so distant from Briony that their actions and experiences 
would have been totally inaccessible to her.  Others, such as the one at the Balham flat, 
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never existed at all (Palmer 295).  Thus, the initial focus on perspective is trumped by the 
ultimate question of ontology: what is real, and what isn’t? 
This shift in focus is even more apparent at the story level, particularly when the 
reader reaches the end of the text. At this stage Cyril Connolly’s letter to Briony, which 
initially seemed to have as its focus the strengths and weaknesses of the modernist 
aesthetic, now raises a much larger question.  The suggestions that Connolly offers to 
Briony concern not only Briony’s novella-within-the-novel, but also the entire narrative 
of Atonement.  Connolly asks Briony, “If this girl has so fully misunderstood… the 
strange little scene that has unfolded before her, how might it affect the lives of the two 
adults? Might she come between them in some disastrous fashion?” (McEwan 403).  The 
suggestions go on, and in light of the reader’s newfound knowledge that the first three 
sections of Atonement are actually the latest draft of the text that began as Briony’s 
novella, the ontological status of many of the novel’s key events comes into question.  If 
Briony didn’t include in her story any indication how she came between Robbie and 
Cecilia until after Connolly suggested that she do so, did it actually happen?  Is 
everything after the scene at the fountain a fabrication, included only at Connolly’s 
behest?  Or is the letter itself a fabrication, used as a kind of plot device?   
Thus, although Atonement does not rewrite a specific modernist text, Moraru’s 
concept of the postmodern rewrite provides a helpful framework for analyzing the ways 
in which the novel engages with the modernist tradition as a whole--even as McEwan's 
text thereby invites reflection on the scope and limits of Moraru's account. While the 
novel initially appears to be concerned with the kind of epistemological questions asked 
by modernist texts, its epilogue essentially rewrites what came before it, shifting the 
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novel’s dominant from an epistemological one to an ontological one.  In doing so, the 
novel rewrites the modernist tradition itself, eschewing that tradition’s techniques and 
central issues in favor of the techniques and issues of postmodernism.  By engaging with 
the modernist tradition in this way, Atonement invites us to expand Moraru’s framework 
to consider the ways in which narratives can rewrite not only individual texts, but entire 
literary movements. 
Never Let Me Go 
Ideological critique is central to Moraru’s concept of the postmodern rewrite.  
That is, the texts Moraru considers postmodern rewrites not only rework the narrative of 
the texts they rewrite, but they also expose and subvert the ideology found in those texts, 
often telling the story from an ideological perspective that is marginalized in the source 
text.  As I hope to have demonstrated in my previous section, it is useful to expand this 
notion of the postmodern rewrite to texts that offer a critique of entire literary movements 
or traditions, as Atonement does with the modernist novel.  Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let 
Me Go is likewise relevant in this connection, its intertextual precursor being the tradition 
of the dystopian novel.  However, Ishiguro’s reworking of the conventions of dystopian 
fiction found in such canonized texts as Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s 1984 
functions not as a critique of those earlier texts, but rather as an update of the genre for 
purposes of critiquing contemporary social practices. 
The tradition of the dystopian novel is itself characterized by ideological critique.  
As the term “dystopian” makes clear, these novels focus on the dark side of an imagined 
utopia, critiquing the “potential negative implications of certain forms of utopian 
thought” (Booker 127-128).  Their critiques, however, go much deeper than this.  The 
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problems that arise in the fictional dystopias explored in these novels are often grounded 
in the social reality of the author’s time (Booker 127-128).  In Brave New World, for 
instance, the fear of a world in which classes of humans are engineered to perform 
specific tasks reflects Huxley’s own fears about society’s growing reliance on 
consumerism and mass production in the 1920s; in the world of the novel, religion has 
been replaced with the worship of Henry Ford and the Model T.  Even so, these critiques 
lack a certain immediacy, given that the worlds of these novels stand at a certain distance 
from our own.  In fact, the disparity between the dystopian world and the real world is 
what characterizes the traditional dystopian critique; in their role as cautionary tales, 
canonical dystopian novels essentially argue “this is how different our world will look if 
our society continues to develop along lines more or less evident today.”  By contrast, in 
Never Let Me Go, Ishiguro reduces the distance between the dystopian world and the real 
world, emphasizing instead the similarities that the dystopian world shares with our own 
world. His critique, then, is not of what our society could become, but of what it already 
is. 
The most telling sign of this rewriting is the novel’s setting.  Generally, dystopian 
novels are set in worlds that are more or less dissimilar to the actual, historical world 
occupied by readers, both geographically (or at least geopolitically) and temporally.  
Brave New World, for instance, takes place in the year A.F. 632 (Huxley 4) – that is, 632 
years after Henry Ford, or the year 2540 according to our calendar – in the Western 
European section of the World State.  Although there are some carryovers from the 
Western Europe of the real world, such as the name "Europe" and the existence of the 
works of Shakespeare, the novel is set so far in the future that its Europe contains almost 
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no other traces of the real Europe of the early 20th century.  By contrast, Never Let Me Go 
is set in a time and place with which many reader will be familiar: England in the late 
1990s.  Even Hailsham, the school at which Kathy, Ruth and Tommy study and which 
Leona Toker and Daniel Chertoff point out “is a ‘sham’ which people ‘hail’” (165), is 
actually the name of a real British town.  Thus the England of Never Let Me Go, unlike 
the Western Europe of Brave New World, shares more than just a name with the real life 
England; the two are nearly identical.  By setting the novel in the recent past, Ishiguro 
invites us to fill in the gaps in his account of the setting with our own knowledge of late 
20th century England.  To use the terms set out by Marie-Laure Ryan, the novel cues 
readers to use (or rather, does not block readers' application of) the principle of minimal 
departure--a principle that enables interpreters to map what they know about their own 
world onto the world of a fictional narrative, unless that narrative indicates otherwise.  
Yet as the novel progresses, we do learn of this England’s one significant 
difference from our own: the existence of human cloning as an established practice. In 
this respect, the novel does block application of the principle of minimal departure, 
establishing a different sort of "accessibility relation" (Ryan 31) between the storyworld 
and the world of contemporary readers than can be found in other fictional genres. 
Contrast, for example, a historical novel or roman à clef, where the principle of minimal 
departure holds across the board. Yet even this feature of the novel points to another way 
in which Ishiguro rewrites the standard relationship between the dystopian world and the 
real world.  Canonical dystopian novels often feature a great deal of exposition on the 
front end in order to signal early how the world of the novel differs from the real world.  
Brave New World, for instance, opens in the Central London Hatchery and Conditioning 
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Centre, where the Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning is giving a group of students a 
tour.  This tour, complete with commentary from the Director, serves as an initiation for 
the reader into the world of the novel.  The Director states that he will “begin at the 
beginning,” and he does, making sure the students (and the reader) understand the world 
before the narrative progresses.  In Never Let Me Go, by contrast, there is no attempt at 
the outset to establish the differences between the world of the novel and the real 
occupied by contemporary readers.  Although, as Toker and Chertoff point out, the reader 
is introduced to certain “euphemistic neologisms” right from the start (164) – we are told 
about "donations" (= compulsory harvesting of organs) and "completions" (= death of 
clones from organ harvesting) all on the first page – the real weight of these terms is not 
explained until much later in the novel.  Therefore, the reader may immediately sense that 
something is different about this world, but, not knowing exactly what that difference is, 
must continue to fill in the gaps of the narrative world with his or her experience of the 
real world. 
Of course, the narrator of a dystopian novel also plays a significant role in the 
relationship between the dystopian world the world of the reader, given that he or she 
provides our point of entry into the dystopian world.  Dystopian narrators are typically 
heterodiegetic, offering an outside perspective on the dystopian world and the events that 
take place within it.  This distant and unfamiliar perspective contributes to the disparity 
that the reader feels between the dystopian world and his or her own world.  Again, 
Ishiguro rewrites this convention, opting for a homodiegetic narrator who also doubles as 
the novel’s protagonist; in other words, Ishiguro uses autodiegetic narration in the novel. 
The narrator, Kathy H., is a likeable character whose friendly, casual tone and 
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straightforward honesty – she admits at one point, “This was all a long time ago so I 
might have gotten some of it wrong” (Ishiguro 13) – have the effect of eliciting the 
reader’s sympathy.  This sympathy, as Toker and Chertoff point out, “is further 
reinforced by the narrator’s direct address to the reader” (168).  The reader’s relationship 
to the story, then, is not that of a passive observer, but an active participant who is 
emotionally invested in the story’s characters. 
 Beyond drawing out the reader’s sympathy, Kathy’s direct addresses to the 
reader affect the way in which the story is narrated.  As previously mentioned, the novel 
does not begin with a great deal of exposition, or at least, not with an explanation of the 
storyworld itself.  Instead, Kathy assumes that the reader is familiar with the world, and 
only explains the specifics of her own situation.  She tells, for example, how “at 
Hailsham we had to have some form of medical almost every day of the week” (Ishiguro 
13) and how “our day at Hailsham always began with an assembly, which was usually 
pretty brief” (Ishiguro 42), all localized details of her own experiences.  There is no 
explicit attempt to inform the reader about the world at large – Kathy assumes that her 
narratee already possesses that knowledge.  Hence information that explains the 
differences between the dystopian world and the real world comes out gradually and 
indirectly.  Indeed, as Toker and Chertoff as well as Shameem Black argue, the reader 
learns of the dystopian world’s significant deviation from our own world – the existence 
of cloning – and, subsequently, of the fate of the clones, in the same way that the clones 
themselves learn of it (Toker and Chertoff 178; Black 792).  The reader is shocked, of 
course, as the clones themselves are, and it is this sense of shock that grants Ishiguro’s 
critique its immediacy.  Unlike canonical dystopian novels such as Brave New World that 
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depict, in a relatively distanced way, what may eventually become of our society, Never 
Let Me Go provides a ground-level view of the disturbing social practices it targets, 
instilling in the reader the fear that perhaps such horrors already exist in our own world.   
Shameem Black has eloquently argued that Never Let Me Go serves as a critique 
of our “globalizing economy [that] ask[s] us to recognize how many people in our own 
world are not considered fully human” (803), and Leona Toker and Daniel Chertoff have 
read the novel as a critique of modern day organ harvesting (178).  But rather than 
identifying the specific institutions and practices critiqued in the novel, I wish to 
underscore here how the novel reworks the very conventions of the canonical dystopian 
novel--and in the process creates new possibilities for readerly engagement with the 
storyworlds such novels evoke.  The world of Never Let Me Go, unlike the worlds of 
traditional dystopian fiction, is hauntingly familiar, and it is this familiarity that makes 
the shock of its dystopian elements that much more poignant.  By using autodiegetic 
narration and direct addresses to the reader, and by only gradually indicating limitations 
on the principle of minimal departure, Ishiguro’s postmodern rewrite constitutes not a 
warning for the future, but a call to examine more closely the world of today.   
Moraru’s concept of the postmodern rewrite provides a framework with which to 
analyze how in each of my three case studies, intertextuality functions in a way that is 
“deconstructive rather than constructive;” that is, all three texts are interested in critique 
rather than imitation (“Intertextuality” 261).  However, in the process of bringing 
Moraru’s framework to bear on my case studies I have suggested strategies for expanding 
and enriching that framework. The multimodal nature of Fun Home, the shift from an 
epistemological to an ontological dominant in Atonement, and the subversion of classic 
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dystopian tropes in Never Let Me Go all suggest that Moraru’s narrow definition of the 
postmodern rewrite—a text that rewrites a single text in an obvious way—must be 
extended to account for the ways in which contemporary experimental narratives use 
intertextuality in the service of an ideological critique, as well as fictional innovation. 
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Chapter 2: Rereading and Reader Response 
In our experience of narrative, we cannot, by definition, experience an entire 
narrative all at once.  Narratives necessarily involve a timeline, and the reader is always 
located on a specific point on that timeline, moving forward through the narrative.  
Wolfgang Iser refers to this phenomenon as the reader’s “wandering viewpoint” (Iser 
cited in Calinescu 45), and Matei Calinescu builds on this concept, contending that both 
the reader’s anticipation of where the narrative is headed and memory of where the 
narrative has already been are constantly changing (45). 
These dual processes correspond to what Peter Rabinowitz and James Phelan call 
configuration and reconfiguration, respectively.  In Before Reading, Rabinowitz frames 
these concepts in a discussion of the rules that readers bring to texts before they have 
even begun to read.  On the one hand, Rabinowitz argues that thanks to rules of 
configuration readers of narratives “activate certain expectations” when “certain elements 
appear” (111).  These rules of configuration govern the reader’s anticipation of what is to 
come, what he or she expects to see, and how he or she reacts to those expectations being 
met or frustrated.  James Phelan, on the other hand, discusses configuration and 
reconfiguration in terms of narrative progression, which he defines as “the synthesis of 
both the textual dynamics that govern the movement of narrative from beginning through 
middle to end and the readerly dynamics… that both follow from and influence those 
textual dynamics” (3).  Configuration, for its part, falls on the side of readerly dynamics, 
and Phelan describes it as “the authorial audience’s hypothesis, implicit or explicit, about 
the direction and purpose of the whole narrative” (19).  Further, as the reader moves 
along the timeline of the narrative, this hypothesis is constantly changing, and the reader 
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must revise his or her hypothesis about the direction of the narrative, as well as the 
purpose of what he or she has already read.  This latter process of revision is what Phelan 
calls reconfiguration.   
In both Phelan’s and Rabinowitz’s models, these processes are in large part 
responsible for the forward motion of the narrative; or rather, they are responsible for 
many of the emotional responses that the reader considers pleasurable as the experience 
of reading a narrative unfolds.  If the reader’s expectations are met, for example, the 
reader feels satisfaction, and if they are frustrated, the reader feel shock, and sometimes 
loss.  Further, the process of waiting to see if his or her hypotheses are correct is 
responsible for the reader’s sense of suspense.  Such responses play an important role in 
readers' experience of a narrative, and in their overall aesthetic judgment of the narrative, 
as Phelan discusses in Chapter 6 of Experiencing Fiction. 
As helpful as these models of configuration and reconfiguration are for analyzing 
responses to narrative, they only seem to account for a first reading.  Clearly, a reader 
working through a novel for the second or third time would not rely on abstract, 
preconceived rules of configuration, since he or she would already know how the story 
ends, and thus would not have to make guesses about it.  In turn, the effects arising from 
whether the reader’s expectations are met or not--a very important part of the reader’s 
experience according to Rabinowitz’s model--would also disappear upon rereading.  
Phelan’s model, too, assumes a first reading.  The experience of a second-time reader of a 
work is not shaped by hypotheses about the direction of the narrative; the rereader knows 
his or her destination.  And although rereading can involve further shifting hypotheses 
about the purpose of the narrative, Phelan suggests that reconfiguration ends with the 
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narrative’s completion, the final step of its progression (21).  That is, Phelan’s model 
suggests that a reader has reached a conclusive reconfiguration of the narrative’s purpose 
once he or she has finished the narrative. 
Taking into account Calinescu’s distinction between reading and rereading, this 
assumption of an initial reading in Phelan’s and Rabinowitz’s models of configuration 
and reconfiguration makes sense.  For Calinescu, reading (i.e. first-time reading) is 
diachronic, while rereading is synchronic (19).  That is, first-time reading is linear, bound 
by time, passive, experiential.  Rereading, on the other hand, if not exactly spatial 
(Calinescu takes issue with the oft-used spatial metaphor), is circular, structural, and 
usually associated with “critical... and formal analysis” (Cornis-Pope 147).  It follows, 
then, that Rabinowitz’s and Phelan’s models, which seek to emphasize the reader’s 
experience of narratives, would assume a first reading.   
The line between reading and rereading, however, is not always so clear, because 
“rereading and reading often go together” (Calinescu 19): there is really no such thing as 
a “virginal first reading” (Calinescu 41), and the “textual analysis” performed in 
rereading is actually “based on reading rather than on the objective structure of the text” 
(Barthes cited in Calinescu 52).  In other words, rereading is not a repeated reading; it is a 
new act of reading that takes a prior reading of the same text as its starting point. Taking 
this claim a step further, I would like to suggest that rereading is an experience in its own 
right.  Many readers revisit a favorite work time and time again not for the purposes of 
structural analysis, but because they find pleasure in rereading the work.  But if the 
driving forces of configuration and reconfiguration are not at play in rereading, or at least 
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not in play in the same manner, what is it that governs the (reader's experience of) 
movement of the narrative?  What is it that keeps the rereader’s attention? 
Although rereading does not involve the processes of configuration and 
reconfiguration in the same way that an initial reading does, it would not be accurate to 
say that these processes have no effect on the experience of rereading.  Certainly, the 
reader does not need to make hypotheses about the direction of the narrative; nor must he 
or she constantly reconsider the purpose of what he or she has already read.  Upon 
rereading, the reader has, at least to some degree, the totality of the work in mind.  In this 
sense, one might argue that the rereader is simply applying what Rabinowitz calls rules of 
coherence, “rework[ing] its elements into a total pattern” (110).  I would contend, 
however, that rereading differs from applying rules of coherence, because, as Rabinowitz 
stipulates, these rules are applied after reading is completed; that is, they are applied 
retrospectively.  And although rereading is always in some way retrospective, it is 
simultaneously progressive, proceeding through the narrative in a linear fashion.  This 
combination of retrospection and progression is what drives the experience of rereading.  
Rereading is characterized not by configuration and reconfiguration, but by the ghosts of 
those processes. The reader retraces his or her configuration and reconfiguration from his 
or her initial reading, but does so with knowledge of the entire narrative, and this 
generates new responses to the narrative.  What is more, the capacity to generate new 
responses upon rereading – and the richness of structure presupposed by that capacity – is 
what makes the rereading of certain texts especially productive. 
Preparations 
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Depending on the narrative at issue, for many readers the ending will be the most 
memorable part of the text.  This is not only because it is, chronologically, the last thing 
the reader reads, but also because the ending is in what Rabinowitz calls a “privileged 
position” (58). According to Rabinowitz, a reader applies certain rules of notice to a text, 
and these rules dictate which parts of a narrative most affect the reader’s concentration 
and scaffolding; that is, rules of notice determine which parts of the text the reader pays 
the greatest attention to, and which parts the reader will base his or her interpretation of 
the unfolding story on (53).  One of these rules deals with privileged positions. Endings 
occupy such a position because they both capture readers' attention and influence their 
interpretation of the overall narrative.  Because endings play such a significant role in 
first readings, they are also quite important in rereading, although in a different way.  
Rabinowitz hints at this idea in Before Reading, but does not expand on it: “Last 
sentences, of course, cannot serve to focus a reading experience (at least, not an initial 
reading experience)” (62).  Last sentences, and endings more generally, do focus the 
experience of rereading, however; they provide the lens through which the reader views 
his or her remembered configuration and reconfiguration, and in turn, they generate new 
responses to the narrative. 
Certain kinds of endings, of course, alter the act of rereading more than others.  
Endings that most drastically shape the experience of rereading contain the element of 
surprise, such as the ending of Atonement.  More than any other type of ending, surprise 
endings ask the reader to reconfigure his or her understanding of the entire narrative--
sometimes in quite drastic ways.  As Phelan points out, however, to be maximally 
effective, or impact the reading experience most extensively, a surprise ending must be 
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prepared for, so that “the audience can recognize that the necessary reconfiguration 
caused by the surprise actually fits well with the beginning and the middle of the 
progression” (95).  Upon rereading, these preparations continue to shape – but in a 
somewhat different way – the reader’s experience of the narrative.  As the reader retraces 
his or her configuration and reconfiguration of the narrative, he or she is put into dialogue 
with his or her first-time-reading self, looking for preparatory moments that he or she 
missed upon first reading the text. 
Atonement 
Consider how these sorts of processes might unfold in a rereading of Atonement.  
After reading three sections of what seems to be a straightforward narrative, the reader 
discovers “London, 1999,” an entry in Briony’s diary.  The entry reveals not only that the 
entire novel up to this point has been a narrative of Briony’s own creation, but also that 
the ending of that novel – the part about Robbie and Cecilia’s reunion, and Briony’s 
promise to recant her testimony – has been a fabrication, or a fabrication within the 
overall fictional world evoked by McEwan's text.  Robbie and Cecilia, the reader learns, 
both perished in the war.  This revelation clearly has numerous consequences for the 
reader’s initial experience of the narrative, consequences that Phelan explores in detail in 
Chapter 5 of Experiencing Fiction.  Phelan discusses the novel’s ending in terms of 
judgments – those of the reader, those of the characters, and even those of McEwan  
himself.  He is ultimately concerned with the reader’s formal, ethical, and aesthetic 
judgments of “McEwan and his novel, especially his springing so much on us so  
suddenly” (Phelan 110).  In order to address these issues, Phelan analyzes the progression 
of the first three sections of the novel in light of the ending. 
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Readers do much the same thing in their rereading – they revisit a short story or 
novel with the totality of the narrative in mind.  In addition to making ethical and 
aesthetic judgments about the narrative, however, the reader also judges his or her own 
initial reading, especially the configurations and reconfigurations it entailed, against his 
or her subsequent rereading. Atonement and its surprise ending make this process 
especially productive, because the text contains both preparations for the ending and what 
I propose to call amplifiers, moments that actually amplify the reconfiguration-causing 
effect of the ending.   
Phelan identifies some of the preparations that have this kind of amplificatory 
function in Atonement.  Specifically, he points to Robbie’s promise to be silent at the end 
of Part Two, and to Briony’s walk to Cecilia’s apartment in Part Three, in which Briony 
describes how she felt a ghostly version of herself break off and walk back to the hospital 
(Phelan 129).  Many of the other preparations in Atonement are located in Briony’s 
discussion of her writing.  In Chapter 3, for instance, Briony – that is, the narrating 
Briony – describes the young Briony’s plans for writing about the scene by the fountain: 
“She could begin now, setting it down as she had seen it… Then the scene could be 
recast, through Cecilia’s eyes, and then Robbie’s” (McEwan 52).  While in the initial 
reading this serves only as a marker of young Briony’s sudden interest in psychological 
realism, the careful rereader realizes that young Briony’s plan for her story corresponds 
almost exactly to what Briony has just narrated.  In another instance, a small detail on the 
level of imagery – Briony’s description of the “the long grass… already stalked by the 
leonine yellow of high summer” (McEwan 48) – shows up again in Cyril Connolly’s 
rejection letter to young Briony, in which he notes his fondness of that particular image 
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(McEwan 402).  While it is unlikely that a first-time reader of the novel would have 
predicted the ending on the basis of this small detail, the repetition sticks out upon 
rereading, making the novel’s ending--its revelation that Briony herself is the author of 
the prior sections of the texts--seem all the more inevitable.  Indeed, part of what makes a 
rereading of Atonement so productive--so rich with new inferences and new forms of 
connection-making--is the degree to which that rereading is likely to be at odds with the 
reader’s initial configuration and reconfiguration.  Whereas the reader’s initial 
hypotheses about the direction of the narrative and ultimate reconfiguration of his or her 
understanding of the novel’s purpose emphasize the reconfiguration-causing effect of the 
novel’s ending, the process of rereading foregrounds the inevitability of the novel’s 
ending.  In effect, the same text produces entirely different responses depending on 
whether it is being read or reread.   
Paradoxically, the rich experience of rereading Atonement is also due in large part 
to the way a rereading of the novel amplifies the reconfiguration-causing effect of the 
novel’s surprise ending.  The moments that I would group under the heading of 
"amplifiers," while having little effect on the configuration and reconfiguration of an 
initial reading, serve to further complicate the ontological questions foregrounded by the 
novel’s ending.  In one such instance, Briony says: “In later years she regretted not being 
more factual, not providing herself with a store of raw material. It would have been 
useful to know what happened, what it looked like, who was there, what was said” 
(McEwan 360).  In an initial reading, this passage merely describes an understandable 
and innocent desire that many people have: to have a more reliable account of their youth 
than that afforded by their own fading memories.  Upon rereading, however, the reader 
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understands that Briony is communicating her own desire, and implicit in this desire is 
the fact that Briony does not remember her days at the hospital, despite giving the reader 
a full account of them, complete with detail and dialogue.  Her letter from Cyril Connolly 
has a similar effect.  In the letter, Connolly offers a series of suggestions to Briony to 
improve “Two Figures by a Fountain,” the story that is ultimately revealed to be the first 
draft of Briony’s novel.  In her final draft – that is, the one the reader has access to – 
Briony has incorporated nearly all of Connolly’s suggestions. The effect of such 
moments is to amplify what might be called the story-eroding force of Briony's final 
revelation, as the rereader keeps applying, throughout the text, his or her knowledge of 
Briony's unreliability as a narrator.  Yet far from undermining the narrative or 
diminishing its status as an aesthetic achievement, these amplificatory effects contribute 
importantly to “the novel’s theme of the relation between art and experience” (Phelan 
129). 
Never Let Me Go 
The preparations in Atonement play an important role in the reader’s experience 
and enjoyment of rereading the novel.  Preparations do not always function in this way, 
however, even in novels with similar surprises. Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, for instance, 
hinges on a jarring revelation, albeit one that occurs halfway through the novel: Kathy 
and her fellow Hailsham students, the reader learns, are clones.  Unlike Atonement, 
however, the revelation is not sudden, but gradual.  In fact, the first-time reader’s 
experience of this revelation is “parallel to the experience of the novel’s characters” 
(Toker and Chertoff 163). The reader’s acts of configuration and reconfiguration, then, 
are also parallel to those of the characters.  The characters, initially unaware of their 
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situation, are forced to hazard guesses about it.  For instance, many of the conversations 
between Kathy and Tommy in part one revolve around their respective guesses about the 
purpose of their artwork. The reader, also in the dark about the artwork’s purpose, is led 
to make similar hypotheses. In this way, the novel explicitly guides the reader’s acts of 
configuration. 
More important for the process of rereading is the way in which the novel, having 
already been read (at least) once, guides the reader’s reconfiguration in subsequent 
readings.  Like the characters themselves, the reader has been “told and not told” about 
the reality of the clones’ situation (Ishiguro 81).  By the time the reader learns that the 
characters are clones, he or she has already been exposed to the terminology of the 
storyworld - terms such as “donors” and “completing” - as well as other signals that point 
to the disparity between the storyworld and the reader’s own world.  These preparations 
for the novel’s surprise revelation differ from those in Atonement in that they are 
explicitly marked as preparations.  In other words, the first time the reader reads the word 
“complete” in the context of the novel, he or she expects that he or she is being prepared 
for some sort of revelation, some deviation from the principle of minimal departure.  Like 
the characters, then, the reader’s sense of shock at the revelation is somewhat dulled, or 
in Kathy’s words, “It was like we’d heard everything somewhere before” (Ishiguro 83, 
emphasis in original).  To put the same point another way, the reader feels the 
inevitability of the revelation not only upon rereading, but also in the initial reading itself.   
The configuration and reconfiguration the reader must make in Never Let Me Go 
thus leads to a different sort of rereading experience than that associated with a rereading 
of Atonement.  The surprise ending of Atonement is so jarring and unexpected, and the 
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preparations for that ending so carefully hidden from the first-time reader, that the 
rereader is in a sense spurred on to seek out such preparations in order to correct his or 
her initial configuration.  The rereader of Atonement is also in a state of prolonged 
reconfiguration, as certain moments in the text amplify the extent of the reconfiguration 
the reader must make in order to account for the novel’s ending.  Hence a rereading of 
Atonement is largely shaped by its surprise ending.  With Never Let Me Go, by contrast, it 
is the initial reading that is shaped by the surprise – the first-time reader sees the surprise 
coming, and looks for preparations in the text as to what that surprise might be or 
involve. Upon rereading, these preparations lose some of their weight, and the rereader 
focuses his or attention on other dimensions of the text--for example, why the cloned 
students never resisted the social or institutional structures that predetermined their fate. 
Fun Home 
As I hope to have shown in my analysis of Atonement and Never Let Me Go, the 
process of rereading often puts the rereader in dialogue with his or her first-time-reading 
self.  This is especially the case in narratives with surprise endings, in which the rereader 
looks for moments in the text that should have prepared him or her for the surprise in his 
or her initial reading.  Phelan, despite not explicitly commenting on the role such 
preparations play in shaping the process of rereading, sees them as necessary for a 
surprise ending to be effective, in that they indicate to the reader how the surprise ending 
actually fits with the beginning and middle of the narrative (95).  In a way that calls into 
question the very idea of "preparation," however, Bechdel’s Fun Home builds the process 
of rereading into a first-time reading. Bechdel achieves this effect through the cyclical 
temporal structure of the narrative, drawing in turn on techniques afforded by the 
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graphic-narrative medium to flesh out this cyclical structure. In Bechdel's text, part of 
what is being prepared for is a process of continuing to return to--in order to reassess the 
significance of--earlier moments in time. Those moments can therefore no longer be 
viewed as merely preparatory. 
Whereas Atonement and Never Let Me Go are, for the most part, linear narratives, 
the temporality of Fun Home is more circular in nature.  Many critics have focused on 
different aspects of the text’s recursive structure; Julia Watson, for instance, argues that 
the text’s “to-and-fro movement” reflects its thematic concern with “transversals… and 
inversions” (37), while David Herman focuses on how the text “exploits the resources of 
graphic narrative to suggest that it is not always possible to know exactly where in time 
one’s own experiences, inferences, or affective responses should be located” (206).  I 
contend that another significant aspect of the recursive temporality of Fun Home, a text 
so concerned with literature itself, is the way in which it foregrounds and thematizes the 
process of rereading.  As I have previously described, the process of rereading involves 
revisiting a text equipped with knowledge that was not available in a first-time reading.  
But in Fun Home, Bechdel frequently revisits aspects of her own narrative, offering a 
new interpretation or, in some cases, entirely new information with each successive pass 
over the narrated or rather re-narrated events.  The moment of Bruce Bechdel’s death, for 
instance, is narrated three separate times.  In each case, Bechdel offers a new perspective 
on the situation: in the first instance, Bechdel assures the reader that she does not think 
her father’s death was an accident (28); in the second instance, Bechdel hypothesizes that 
the truck may have “passed without incident” if she had not come out to her parents (59); 
in the third instance, Bechdel has come to terms with her father’s “hurtling into the sea,” 
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understanding that “he was there to catch me when I leapt” (232).  Like the process of 
rereading, Bechdel’s process of revisiting moments of her life uncovers in these moments 
a newfound significance. Bechdel's narration suggests that, thanks to details about these 
moments made available through the act of narrative revisitation itself, the moments in 
question constituted turning points in her life story.   
The multimodal nature of the graphic-narrative medium allows Bechdel to 
foreground this process of revisitation.  Specifically, the use of repeated panels in the 
visual track allows the text to explicitly signal a return to an earlier moment in the 
narrative, while the verbal track containing the older Bechdel's narration– or, in some 
cases, speech balloons superimposed on top of narrated events represented in the visual 
track – allow Bechdel to share new information or to view the moment from a new 
perspective.  For instance, Alison’s telephone conversation with her mother, in which she 
learns of her father’s homosexuality, is repeated three times throughout the narrative.  In 
each of the three instances, Alison is depicted lying on the floor with a flabbergasted 
expression, clutching the telephone in her hand.  In the first occurrence, the revelation is 
limited; Alison’s mother only tells her about her father’s affairs with other men (Bechdel 
58-59).  In the second instance, however, Alison is depicted as saying: “Roy, our 
babysitter?!”--indicating that Bruce has also had affairs with underage boys (Bechdel 79).  
Interestingly, Bechdel here describes the moment as an “abrupt and wholesale revision of 
my history” (79).  This moment not only revises the young Alison’s history, but also 
revises Bechdel’s account of that history, given that her initial narration of this moment 
did not include any information about Bruce’s affair with Roy.  In using the visual track 
to signal a return to an earlier event, a speech balloon corresponding to an utterance 
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within the storyworld to convey a new aspect of the situation, and the narration included 
in a text box at the top of the panel to highlight and comment on this process of revision 
and revisitation, Bechdel uses word-image combinations to thematize the process of 
rereading itself. 
Because Bechdel’s use of recursive temporality and word-image combinations 
builds the process of rereading into a first-time reading of Fun Home, the experience of 
actually rereading the text is more continuous with the process of initially reading the 
narrative than is the case with Atonement and Never Let Me Go.  By the time the reader 
has finished Fun Home for the first time, he or she has already revisited many moments 
of the narrative several times in different contexts, and a rereading of the text feels like a 
continuation of this process of revisitation rather than a restart.  Phelan’s notion that 
surprises in a narrative must be prepared for – a notion that was developed on the basis of 
linear, monomodal print texts – does not seem to apply to a text with this sort of recursive 
structure.  In a linear narrative, the reader revisits the earlier parts of the text to see how 
the surprise fits, while the jarring moments in Fun Home, though occurring toward the 
end of the time span covered by Bechdel's narration, are revisited at several points 
throughout the narrative. 
Rereader/narrator relationship 
According to Phelan, “narrativity involves the interaction of two kinds of change: 
that experienced by the characters and that experienced by the audience in its developing 
responses to the characters’ changes” (7).  Phelan is quick to point out that the reader not 
only responds to the characters and their actions, but also makes judgments of “the ethics 
of storytelling itself” (12).  It is not only the reader’s relationship to characters and events 
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that affects his or her experience of narrative, but also the reader’s relationship to the 
narrator.  However, despite its emphasis on textual and readerly dynamics – that is, the 
changes, both in the text and the reader, that move the narrative forward – Phelan’s 
model does not account for how the reader’s judgments of the narrator change upon 
rereading.  For each of my three case studies, the process of rereading invites the reader 
to reconfigure his or her judgments of the narrator.  In the case of Atonement, the rereader 
must make an entirely new set of judgments, as the narrator does not even become fully 
present (or fully known) until rereading.  In Never Let Me Go, the process of rereading 
creates a critical distance between the reader and the narrator, who, upon first reading, 
appears to be a highly sympathetic character.  Finally, Fun Home makes use of 
intertextuality to encourage rereading, which leads the rereader to make a positive ethical 
judgment of Bechdel as storyteller. 
The process of rereading Atonement does not merely involve a reconfiguration of 
the reader’s judgments of the narrator, but actually constructs a narrating-I who was not 
present upon the first-time reading.  In an initial reading of the novel, the narration does 
not even appear to be homodiegetic.  Indeed, up until “London, 1999,” the reader 
experiences the novel as a typical heterodiegetic narrative, the narration of which is 
focalized through a variety of characters.  For the most part, the narrator remains invisible 
to the first-time reader, making a negligible impact on both the reader’s temporal 
experience of and attitude toward the narrated events.  That is, the reader experiences the 
events more or less as the characters experience them, and does not feel that an external 
perspective is guiding any of his or her judgments. 
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Even in the rare instances in which the narrator pulls back from the perspective of 
the characters to offer a glimpse into their future thoughts, the first-time reader 
experiences these moments as a routine shift in focalization, rather than representative of 
the views of some external perspective.  It is not until a rereading of the novel, when the 
reader is finally aware that the narration is Briony’s own, that these moments have a 
profound impact on the reader’s judgments.  In one instance the narrator says, “In later 
years she regretted not being more factual, not providing herself with a store of raw 
material” (McEwan 360). In addition to amplifying the rereader’s reconfiguration, as I 
discussed in the previous section, this passage also has consequences for the rereader’s 
judgments of the narrator.  In a first-time reading, this statement invites a benign 
interpretive judgment of the older Briony – she longs for an accurate recollection of the 
past – and furthermore, the judgment is of the older Briony only as she functions as a 
character, as another consciousness through which the narration is briefly focalized. In a 
rereading of the novel, however, the judgment induced by this statement becomes 
simultaneously more incriminating and more significant for the reader’s experience of the 
narrative.  If Briony is narrating the events in the novel, yet also longs for a more 
accurate recollection of those events, then her narration must be, to a large extent, 
unreliable, which leads the rereader not only to arrive at a different, more negative 
assessment of Briony as a narrator, but also to doubt the veracity of the entire narrative.  
In a similar moment, the focalization shifts away from young Briony to a much 
older Briony, and reveals Briony’s retrospective thoughts on her growth as a writer:  
Six decades later she would describe how at the age of thirteen she had 
written her way through a whole history of literature… She would be well 
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aware of the extent of her self-mythologizing, and she gave her account a 
self-mocking, or mock-heroic tone… She knew that it was not correct to 
refer to her dramas in the plural, that her mockery distanced her from the 
earnest, reflective child, and that it was not the long-ago morning she was 
recalling so much as her subsequent accounts of it. (McEwan 52)  
Again, for a first-time reader, this passage marks only a shift in focalization.  This shift to 
the perspective of a future Briony may strike the reader as paraleptic – that is, “giving 
more [information] than is authorized in principle in the code of focalization governing 
the whole” (Genette, “Narrative Discourse” 195). In other words, the reader may be 
inclined to interpret the perspective shift as a shift to an external source of information 
about the storyworld--a source not appealed to up to this point in the narrative. Unaware 
that Briony is responsible for the shift, the reader has no basis for making a judgment 
about her in connection with the mode of narration being used.  If anything, the first-time 
reader might negatively judge the work itself, seeing this shift to the future as a break 
from the pattern that McEwan had previously established.  The first-time reader might 
also make a judgment of the older Briony as character, noting that even six decades later 
she is unable to escape her habit of romanticizing; but in this case, the reader’s judgments 
of Briony’s hypothetical conception of her thirteen-year-old self do not affect the reader’s 
judgments of the narration. 
In a rereading of the novel, by contrast, this passage has a direct impact on the 
reader’s judgments of the narrating Briony, and thus of her narration.  Unlike a first-time 
reader, the rereader knows that the perspective found in this passage represents the older 
Briony's vantage point on events.  This passage, then, emphasizes to the rereader the 
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narration’s status as a retrospective--and, crucially, homodiegetic--account.  Furthermore, 
the rereader realizes that the passage explicitly comments on the extent to which Briony’s 
retrospective account has been mediated through the perspective afforded by later 
circumstances and events.  The passage thus simultaneously invites the rereader to share 
in the perspective of the older, narrating Briony and to judge that perspective, and 
consequently the narration, as unreliable.   
The role of the older, narrating Kathy in Never Let Me Go, unlike the narrating 
version of Briony in Atonement, is not hidden from the first-time reader.  In fact, the first-
time reader may feel a particular affinity with Kathy, since the structure of the narration 
requires the reader to make sense of the events in parallel with Kathy's attempts to make 
sense of them.  Upon rereading, however, the reader applies his or her knowledge of the 
narrative as a whole to Kathy’s narration, and this vantage point invites an entirely 
different set of judgments than those likely to be made by the first-time reader.  The first-
time reader is likely to feel positively disposed to the honesty--or humility--of Kathy’s 
narration.  Kathy qualifies many details of her account with words and phrases such as 
“maybe,” “probably,” and “I suppose.”  At times, she’s even more explicit, such as when 
she says, “Or maybe I’m remembering it wrong” (Ishiguro 8).  This carefulness on 
Kathy's part invites the first-time reader to trust her, because, unlike Briony in 
Atonement, Kathy is up front with the reader about her imperfect memory and about the 
effects that memory may have on her account.    
Furthermore, the first-time reader can only come to know the storyworld through 
Kathy’s own attempts to make sense of it.  As I have previously suggested, details of the 
storyworld are not provided at the outset, but are only revealed incrementally, so that the 
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reader must rely on Kathy’s judgments about her world in order to formulate his or her 
own judgments.  For instance, when Kathy says, early on in the novel, “That was when I 
first understood, really understood, just how lucky we’d been – Tommy, Ruth, me, all the 
rest of us” (Ishiguro 6), the first-time reader takes it for granted that this claim is true, as 
he or she does not yet have further information about the storyworld against which to test 
it. 
Upon rereading, however, the reader no longer relies solely on Kathy’s judgments 
in his or her evaluation of the storyworld or of Kathy herself.  Having already finished 
the narrative, the rereader now has knowledge of the rules governing the clones 
inhabiting the storyworld, as disclosed in Kathy’s interview with Miss Emily, as well as 
knowledge of Kathy’s ultimate understanding of her world and her place in it.  In 
revisiting the narrative, the rereader applies this knowledge to Kathy’s narration, and this 
process leads the rereader to make critical judgments of Kathy’s passivity.  Unlike in 
Atonement, however, these negative judgments are not directed toward the narrator 
herself, but instead toward the dominant ideology that is responsible for her passivity.  
One moment that draws such judgments from the rereader comes when Madame catches 
Kathy dancing to the song “Never Let Me Go.”  As Toker and Chertoff point out, “Kathy 
seems to repress a possible meaning that strongly suggests itself to the reader: the song’s 
refrain enhances the irony of Hailsham students’ not wanting to be released” (167, 
emphasis in original).  What Toker and Chertoff fail to point out, however, is that such a 
meaning does not suggest itself until rereading; only the rereader, knowing that Kathy 
never makes an attempt to escape her fate, is able to make this connection.   
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Indeed, the rereader, applying the knowledge disclosed in Kathy’s interview with 
Miss Emily, may come to question many of Kathy’s interpretations.  In the interview, 
Miss Emily tells Kathy that the purpose of Hailsham was to convince the public of the 
clones’ inherent worth, a project that ultimately failed (Ishiguro 260-262).  She goes on to 
say that if the clones hadn’t been sheltered from that reality, “You would have told us it 
was all pointless, and how could we have argued with you?” (Ishiguro 268).  Upon 
rereading, the reader understands that Kathy has used this information in concluding how 
“lucky we’d been” (Ishiguro 6).  Of course, Kathy’s sense of being lucky also serves as a 
reflection on the fact that the clones at Hailsham had it better than clones elsewhere.  
Still, Kathy's accepting this fact as justification for acquiescing to her own situation 
suggests to the reader the strength of the dominant ideology, an ideology that permeates 
even those like Miss Emily who claim to have the clones’ best interest in mind.  In this 
way, moments in Never Let Me Go that engender sympathy in the first-time reader lead 
the rereader to look critically on Kathy’s passivity, which in turn strengthens Ishiguro’s 
ideological critique of the insitutions and practices represented in the storyworld. 
While Atonement and Never Let Me Go elicit a critical stance toward or distrust of 
their respective narrators, a rereading of Fun Home only strengthens the reader’s sense of 
trust in Bechdel as narrator and guide.  In a first-time reading, Bechdel establishes this 
close relationship with the reader.  As Julia Watson points out, the very medium of the 
graphic memoir is especially suited to creating such a relationship: “The way we read 
cartoons, as a pleasurable alternative to high seriousness… affords occasions for reader 
identification with characters and situations that solicit our autobiographical intimacy” 
(29).  Despite creating a pleasurable reading experience, Bechdel expects much from her 
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readers; she “calls upon readers to be literate in many kinds of texts… as a sophisticated 
and politically impassioned community” (Watson 29).  This expectation encourages 
readers to revisit the memoir as their literacy grows, and this process in turn fosters, via 
rereading of the text, increasingly positive judgments of Bechdel as a storyteller. 
Unlike Atonement, a rereading of which is unique precisely because of what the 
novel hides from the first-time reader, Fun Home does not hide its depth in a surprise 
revelation.  Instead, Fun Home creates layers meaning through a vast network of 
intertextual references – from James Joyce and Marcel Proust to Kate Millett and The 
Wind in the Willows – all of which are present even to the first-time reader.  The structure 
of Fun Home, then, allows for a richer and more complex interpretation with each 
subsequent reading, without diminishing the experience of the first-time reading.  For 
instance, the inclusion of a copy of Anna Karenina in the illustration of Alison playing a 
game of “airplane” with her father (Bechdel 3) can certainly be read as “foreshadow[ing] 
her father’s later suicide” (Freedman 131), but that realization is certainly not integral to 
the first-time reader’s experience of the narrative.  However, the subtle allusion to that 
text encourages the reader who is not familiar with Tolstoy to revisit Fun Home after 
broadening his or her literary knowledge. Indeed, the graphic medium allows such 
allusions to be non-intrusive enough not to disrupt the experience of reading, but present 
enough to encourage the reader to explore the intertext. Thus, Bechdel sometimes alludes 
to other works by including images of novel covers in individual panels. 
Even the more extensive allusions are structured in such a way that they 
encourage, but do not require, the reader’s prior knowledge of the intertext--and thus 
function as a spur for rereading once the reader has familiarized himself or herself with 
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the text at issue.  Bechdel’s allusions to both Homer’s Odyssey and Joyce’s Ulysses in the 
final chapter, for instance, are supplemental but not essential to the reader’s 
understanding of the narrative.  In recounting how she and her father would never discuss 
their “shared predilection” again after their visit to the movie theater, Bechdel uses the 
Odyssey and Ulysses to frame her account: “We had our Ithaca moment” (222).  In 
context, even the reader who is unfamiliar with Homer or Joyce is able to gather that this 
moment between Alison and her father is of profound significance to her.  However, the 
way in which “the Homeric and Joycean language of Odyssey… becomes the very 
language of her sexual and literary awakening” (Freedman 136) also suggests to the 
reader that these intertexts themselves are of profound significance to Bechdel, and that 
they are useful in analyzing Bechdel’s own narrative.  Indeed, Bechdel even places the 
statement “We had our Ithaca moment” in a text box on top of an illustration of a passage 
from the “Ithaca” chapter of Joyce’s Ulysses, which provides the reader with a preview of 
the intertext.  In this way, Bechdel’s extensive use of intertextuality invites the reader to 
trace out the network of allusions included in the text, and then to revisit her own 
narrative with this expanded literary background. 
As Phelan argues in Experiencing Fiction, “if we find the values underlying our 
ethical judgments of characters or narrators to be deficient but nevertheless deployed with 
great skill, we will judge the aesthetics of the narrative more highly than its ethics” (14).  
But the process of rereading complicates matters. In texts like Never Let Me Go and 
Atonement, the first-time reader may make a positive ethical judgment of the text and of 
its author, whereas a rereading of that text will reveal the narrator to be ethically 
deficient, or at least ethically questionable.  In Fun Home, by contrast, the reader’s 
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aesthetic judgment of the text’s rereadability and his or her ethical judgment of Bechdel 
as narrator are closely related.  Because Fun Home’s extensive use of intertextuality 
encourages subsequent readings, the rereader makes a positive ethical judgment of 
Bechdel as his or her guide through the narrative.  
According to Phelan and Rabinowitz, the process of reading narrative is one that 
is bound up in time.  As the term “narrative progression” suggests, the reader’s 
configuration and reconfiguration are volatile, changing frequently as he or she advances 
through the narrative.  What Phelan and Rabinowitz fail to consider, however, is that the 
process of rereading is an extension of this narrative progression.  As I hope to have 
shown in my discussion of preparations and of judgments of narrators in each of my three 
case studies, the reader’s understanding of and reaction to a narrative continues to change 
during the process of rereading.  The issue of rereading is one that has largely been 
neglected in the field of narrative theory, and its implications for other aspects of 
narrative still need to be explored. 
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Chapter 3: Fictional and Factual Worlds 
In the wake of the attempts of postmodernism and poststructuralism to erase the 
boundary between fictional discourse and historical discourse, some scholars have found 
it beneficial to reassert the importance of such a boundary.  Among these scholars are 
Dorrit Cohn—who defines fiction as nonreferential narrative—and Marie-Laure Ryan 
and Lubomír Doležel, both of whom define fiction in terms of possible-worlds semantics.  
In formulating a method of distinguishing between factual and fictional narrative, each of 
these scholars has addressed areas of overlap where the distinction becomes unclear.  
While the work of these scholars helps to illuminate issues of fictionality in my case 
studies, I argue that each of my case studies presents a unique area of overlap that these 
existing frameworks do not account for—Fun Home through its use of fictional 
analogues for real-world individuals; Atonement through the process I have termed 
“embedded recentering,” where readers must take account of fictional narratives within 
the fictional storyworld; and Never Let Me Go through its use of counterfactual history, 
or the mapping out of events that did not in fact occur but might have. 
Fun Home 
In her discussion of the crucial distinction between first-person and third-person 
life writing, Dorrit Cohn acknowledges that these two "regimes of person" overlap in 
what she calls “witness biographies,” or “a special type of historical biography that has a 
strong component of autobiography” (29).  Bechdel’s Fun Home exists in a similarly 
liminal space, although it may be more accurately classified as an autobiography that has 
a strong component of biography.  Julia Watson has noted the work’s multiple 
biographical interests, describing the narrative as “split between a solo story, Bechdel’s 
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child narrator Alison’s development of an ‘I,’ and the domestic ethnography of the 
family” (30).  Although the Bechdel family unit is certainly a focal point of the memoir, I 
contend that the memoir’s structure, as well as many of its literary allusions – specifically 
Joyce’s Ulysses and, as Watson herself points out, the Icarus-Daedalus myth (30) – invite 
us to read the text especially as the story of Alison and her father, Bruce Bechdel.  
Additionally, such intertexts serve as Bechdel’s primary tool for describing her father as 
well as for modeling the complex dynamic of their relationship. These aspects of Fun 
Home pose a challenge for Cohn’s distinction between fictional and factual life writing; 
for Cohn, the border between third-person fiction and factual biography is crossed only 
when biography attempts to mimic the ability of fiction to “convey… the intimate 
subjective experiences of its characters” (24).  Fun Home, however, challenges the 
distinction by using fictional analogues as a means of narrating a factual life story.   
Although all autobiographies must obviously feature characters other than the “I” 
who is the author and the primary subject of the work, Bechdel presents Fun Home as a 
story that is as much about her father as it is about herself, as much “witness biography” 
as it is autobiography.  If, as Peter Rabinowitz argues, the beginning and ending of a 
narrative are “privileged positions” that warrant the reader’s careful attention (58), then it 
is telling that the first and last panels of Fun Home are illustrations of Alison and Bruce 
interacting (Bechdel 3, 232).  Indeed, the very first sentence of the narration makes 
Bruce, not Alison, its primary subject: “Like many fathers, mine could occasionally be 
prevailed on for a spot of 'airplane'” (Bechdel 3).  In addition to structuring her narrative 
around her father, Bechdel also frequently defines herself in relation to him.  For 
example, one page features four panels in which Alison and her father are presented in 
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terms of four different binary oppositions: “I was Spartan to my father’s Athenian.  
Modern to his Victorian.  Butch to his Nelly.  Utilitarian to his Aesthete” (Bechdel 15).  
Bechdel also defines her sexuality in relation to her father’s, as Watson points out: 
“Bechdel makes her father’s story of private shame, ‘perversion,’ and early violent death 
into a happier story that enabled her own embrace of sexuality as their shared ‘erotic 
truth’” (48).  Finally, Bechdel foregrounds her relationship with her father by mapping 
that relationship onto fictional models of parent/offspring relationships, such as that 
between Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus from Ulysses and between Icarus and 
Daedalus from Greek mythology.   
In Fun Home, these fictional models act “not only as descriptive devices” as 
Bechdel herself calls them (67), but also as heuristic devices; in other words, Bechdel 
relies on the reader’s prior understanding of certain fictional characters and relationships 
in order to develop his or her understanding of the characters and relationships in her own 
narrative.  In the first scene, for example, in which Alison and her father are playing 
“airplane,” she describes their relationship as a “reenactment of this mythic relationship 
[between Icarus and Daedalus]” (Bechdel 4).  Although she often complicates the 
mapping of her relationships onto fictional models – her father, for instance, is at once 
Daedalus and Icarus, both a “skillful artificer” and the one “who was to plummet from 
the sky” (Bechdel 4) – she still uses these models as frames of reference for her reader’s 
understanding of those involved in her own life story, especially her father.  In this 
particular example, Bechdel’s allusion works to characterize Bruce Bechdel as 
simultaneously obsessed with his craft and fated to fail.  In a similar instance, Bechdel 
compares her and father to “fatherless Stephen and sonless Bloom having their equivocal 
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late-night cocoa at 7 Eccles Street” (221).  Here, the allusion to Ulysses expresses the 
void Alison feels in her relationship with her father, while at the same time implying that 
Bruce himself felt a similar void. 
Bechdel makes clear throughout the narrative that her use of fictional analogues to 
describe her father is necessary because he thought of himself in fictional terms.  At 
times, these claims are themselves couched within literary allusions: “But in a way 
Gatsby’s pristine books and my father’s worn ones signify the same thing—the 
preference of a fiction to reality” (Bechdel 85). Bechdel even provides evidence for these 
claims, pointing to a series of letters Bruce wrote Helen before they were married.  In the 
letters, Bruce explains how he “tore through Fitzgerald’s stories, seeing himself in 
various characters” (Bechdel 63).  In another instance, Bechdel forgoes specific literary 
references to comment on her father in more general terms: “[H]owever convincing they 
might be, you can’t lay hands on a fictional character” (84).  In its immediate context, 
this comment seems critical of Bruce’s affectation of a fictional persona, which manifests 
itself not only in his library but also in the role-playing entailed by his hidden sexuality.  
However, Bechdel’s assertion that “my parents are most real to me in fictional terms” 
suggests that an accurate depiction of her father cannot be uncoupled from the realm of 
fiction.  
Bechdel's practice of fleshing out a factual (auto)biography via fictional 
characters constitutes a sort of gray area between factual and fictional life writing that 
Cohn does not account for.  For Cohn, third-person fiction is set apart from factual 
biography by its ability to enter the inner workings of its characters’ minds (24).  Factual 
biography, Cohn acknowledges, is obviously interested in the mental states of its subject, 
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as well, but in attempting to express that interest, it must employ techniques different 
from those used in third-person fiction (26).  The most prevalent of these techniques is 
what Cohn calls psycho-narration, which is “a technique where the narrator’s voice is 
clearly set off from the language that runs through the subject’s head” (26).  As Cohn 
points out, this technique, also known as indirect discourse, is most commonly marked by 
“conjectural and inferential syntax”--that is, by the use of qualifiers such as “perhaps” 
and “must have” (27).  Factual texts that blur the boundary between fictional and factual 
life writing are those that eschew techniques like psycho-narration, opting instead to enter 
into the minds of actual persons using techniques typically reserved for fictional texts; the 
genre of New Journalism occupies such a gray area (Cohn 28). 
Bechdel’s challenge to Cohn’s distinction does not lie in her depiction of Bruce's 
mental states; in fact, when Bechdel attempts to capture her father’s inner life, her 
narration features the sort of hedges that Cohn associates with psycho-narration.  In one 
instance, Bechdel hypothesizes about Bruce’s thought process upon meeting her mother, 
Helen. Invoking a potential parallel between Bruce and the narrator in Remembrance of 
Things Past, Bechdel writes: “Had he somehow conflated her with her address, like 
Proust’s narrator had with Gilberte and the garden?” (105).  Here, Bechdel puts the 
comparison in the form of a question, thereby marking it off as her own hypothesis 
instead of a claim to fact. But Bechdel does challenge Cohn’s distinction by asserting the 
validity of fictional analogues as a way of narrating a factual life story.  According to 
Bechdel, her father’s story cannot be told without the use of fictional references.  Cohn's 
clear-cut distinction between third-person fiction and factual biography does not account 
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for the blending of fictional and factual discourse that occurs in Fun Home, let alone the 
usefulness of such a blending. 
By conveying her father's and her own life stories through fictional analogues, 
Bechdel questions the usefulness of a hard and fast distinction between factuality and 
fictionality—suggesting how people sometimes orient themselves, in their everyday 
lives, around fictional characters, situations, and events.  In this way Fun Home suggests 
a paradox: that in the case of someone like Bruce Bechdel, who thought of himself 
largely in fictional terms, transgressing the line between factual and fictional genres of 
narrative is perhaps the only legitimate means of writing an accurate life story.   
Atonement 
As Cohn's discussion in The Distinction of Fiction suggests, the salience of the 
distinction between factual and fictional narratives is reinforced by texts that play with 
this boundary. The revelation that a supposedly autobiographical work is actually a work 
of fiction often incites uproar among readers, who feel slighted by the deceptive 
classification.  Perhaps the best explanation of this phenomenon comes from Philippe 
Lejeune, who characterizes the experiences of reading autobiography and of reading 
fiction in terms of two very different pacts entered into by the reader and the author (14).  
According to Lejeune, autobiography must make clear to the reader its status as 
autobiography either through an explicit statement to that effect or by establishing 
identity (e.g., through naming) among the author, narrator, and protagonist of the 
autobiographical account.  Fiction, on the other hand, affirms its fictionality either 
through explicit signals (such as use of the term “novel” on the cover or signposts that 
include attributions of extended stretches of thought to characters in third-person or 
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heterodiegetic narratives) or through the nonidentity of author, narrator, and protagonist.  
The presence of the autobiographical or fictional pact “determines the attitude of the 
reader” (Lejeune 14) and explains why readers feel that they have wasted their time if 
they have assumed that an autobiographical pact was in place when it was not—and also 
why readers who assumed they were reading a fictional narrative would need to 
recalibrate their interpretation if it came to light that the narrative were in fact 
autobiographical. 
Analogously, readers of Atonement feel slighted by the revelation that Briony—a 
fictional character whom the text reveals to be the narrator of her own and others' life 
stories—has fabricated many parts of her narrative.  In a review for the Weekly Standard, 
for example, Margaret Boerner says: “In a kind of lunacy that one supposes he imagined 
was like Ionesco’s absurdity, McEwan destroys the structure he has set up and tells us it 
was all fiction” (43).  The difference, of course, is that Atonement is clearly marked as a 
work of fiction; thus its readers are upset not because the events narrated in the novel did 
not take place in the real world, but because those events did not actually take place, as it 
turns out, in the fictional world of the novel.  The reader knows that he or she is entering 
into a fictional pact with McEwan from the outset, and that pact is not violated.  Still, 
many readers feel that they have been duped by the novel’s ending.  Lejeune’s model, 
then, cannot sufficiently explain some readers’ dissatisfaction with the ending of 
Atonement.  Instead, we must turn to a model that takes into account the reader’s 
investment in the reality of a fictional world. 
In developing her model of “fictional recentering,” which proposes “to 
characterize the fictional gesture in the framework of modal logic and the semantics of 
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possible worlds,” Marie-Laure Ryan points to the “pseudoreality” and “pseudoactuality” 
of fictional characters and worlds as the source of readers’ investment in fictional texts 
(16, 21-22).  She argues that fictional worlds lack a “world-creating predicate”—a term 
Ryan borrows from James McCawley—such as “to dream, to intend, to believe, to 
consider, to fantasize, to hypothesize” (19).  The absence of such a predicate means that 
in fiction, there is no “bridge between the actual world and the alternative possible 
world;” instead, “speaker, hearer, and speech act are relocated within the created world” 
(Ryan 22).  Both the speaker and the hearer, then, agree to pretend that the possible world 
created by the text is the actual world, and in doing so, they treat the characters and 
situations as though they were real and thus deserving of empathy.   
Importantly, Ryan tells us, fictional texts create not only a world, but also a full-
fledged “textual universe,” complete with its own network of (second-order or 
embedded) alternative possible worlds.  In order to keep the complex relationships 
among these worlds and universes clear, Ryan lays out the three modal systems at the 
heart of her concept of fictional recentering.  First, there is our actual universe, at the 
center of which is the actual world; second, there is the textual universe, which is created 
by the text, and which has at its center the textual actual world; third, there is the system 
that the textual universe represents, called the referential universe, whose central world is 
the textual reference world, which is the world that the textual actual world represents 
(Ryan 24).  With this typology, Ryan is able to describe various types of discourse—
including nonfiction, errors, lies, fiction, and fiction with unreliable narration—as 
evoking possible worlds that stand in various kinds of relations with one another and with 
the actual world inhabited by writers and readers (28). 
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To return to Atonement, Ryan’s model of fictional recentering allows for a 
distinction between factual and fictional discourse within a textual actual world, which in 
turn explains why some readers react so strongly to the novel’s ending: the reader, who 
has temporarily relocated to the textual universe of the novel, is led to believe that the 
events narrated really happened in that universe, and is displeased when this 
understanding proves to be misguided.  Still, an important question remains: what is the 
relationship between the world projected by Briony’s novel and the world ultimately 
projected by McEwan’s novel, the world that is revealed to be the textual actual world by 
the “London, 1999” section of the novel?  Is the world created by Briony’s novel an 
alternative possible world that she dreams up, a satellite to the textual actual world?  Or is 
the difference at the level of system rather than of world—that is, is the textual universe 
projected by Briony’s novel a misrepresentation of the reference universe that subtends 
McEwan's text as a whole? 
The answer to these questions depends on how we classify the world created by 
Briony’s novel.  We could, for instance, classify Briony’s narrative as a lie, or, less 
negatively, as a fantasy.  There is certainly evidence to support such a classification, such 
as when Briony describes her narrative as a more satisfying alternative to “the bleakest 
realism” (McEwan 478).  If we took this route, then the world Briony creates could be 
described as one of many alternative possible worlds that exist as satellites in the textual 
universe created by McEwan’s novel.  Alternatively, if we consider Briony an unreliable 
narrator, then we could say that there is a mismatch between the textual actual world 
projected by her novel and the textual reference world that readers assume to be at the 
basis of McEwan's larger narrative.  
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I contend that neither of these explanations is sufficient, for the simple reason that 
Briony is a novelist.  Just as McEwan’s novel exists as a work of fiction in the real world, 
Briony’s novel exists as a work of fiction within the textual actual world produced by 
McEwan’s text.  At the time Briony writes her diary entry, the novel still does not have 
an audience—she makes clear that it will not be published until after her death—but she 
clearly intends for it to be published as a work of fiction, and thus to be read as such.  As 
a work of fiction, Briony’s narrative contains no world-creating predicate, but instead 
relocates its reader to the second-order or embedded fictional world it creates.  Therefore, 
a reading of Atonement involves what I call embedded recentering, a process that Ryan’s 
model does not completely account for. 
In Ryan’s model, the game of fictional recentering depends on an agreement 
between the author and the reader to pretend that the world projected by the text is the 
actual world—at least for the duration of the game (23).  By contrast, the embedded 
recentering in Atonement involves a contract whose terms are clear to only one party 
involved in the process of narrative communication: Ian McEwan.  In engaging with 
Atonement, the reader agrees to immerse himself or herself in the text and to take the 
world presented by the narrator as the actual world.  What the reader does not realize, 
however, is that he or she has actually been relocated twice—first to McEwan’s fictional 
world, and then, by virtue of the novel-within-the-novel, to Briony’s fictional world.  
Like a reader of a fictional work that has been deceptively marked as memoir, the reader 
of Atonement mistakenly thinks that the statements made in the text are true in a world 
that can be deemed actual (in this case, the textual actual world).  With the revelation that 
the first three parts of Atonement constitute Briony’s novel, however, the reader must 
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reassess what constitutes the textual actual world of McEwan’s text, or rather how that 
world is structured.  This process of reassessment—which requires situating the world 
Briony creates as a novelist within the world that McEwan creates as a novelist—is 
responsible for the ending’s jarring effect. 
Why, then, does the ending of Atonement leave some readers slighted? I believe 
that the answer lies in how the text plays with the very concept of fictionality, or with 
what constitutes a world having fictional status.  Ryan’s model of fictional recentering 
helps illuminate the issues at stake and how those complexities affect reader response. 
Specifically, suggesting that the agreement between the author and the reader to pretend 
that the world projected by a fictional text is the actual world accounts for the reader’s 
investment in that world, the model suggests why some readers feel cheated by the 
ending of Atonement—as if the rug of the textual actual world had been pulled out from 
under their feet.  At the same time, however, Atonement’s process of embedded 
recentering invites us to rethink aspects of Ryan’s account—in particular, the 
complexities that can result when a character within a fictional world creates a second-
order fictional world, but isn't revealed as having done so until late in the narrative. In 
such cases, the second-order recentering is covert and hence unilateral, by analogy with 
acts of lying. Perhaps the structural similarities between acts of lying and covert acts of 
embedded recentering accounts for some readers' sense that both Briony and McEwan are 
deceivers in Atonement.  
Never Let Me Go 
Like Marie-Laure Ryan, Lubomír Doležel turns to the framework of possible-
worlds semantics to deal with areas of overlap between fictional and historical worlds.  
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Although Doležel takes issue with the postmodernist collapsing of the distinction 
between historiography and the making of fiction, he asserts that the possible-worlds 
approach “has no quarrel with the idea of open boundary, but it couples this 
acknowledgment with a curiosity to know what happens…to the historical when it 
penetrates into fictional worlds and what happens to the fictional when it intrudes into 
historical worlds” (264).  One mode of intrusion that Doležel discusses at length is that of 
counterfactual history.  In creating a counterfactual history, one imagines a possible 
world whose history differs from that of the actual world in a rather specific way; a world 
in which Germany won World War II is a common example.  Doležel distinguishes 
furthermore between two kinds of counterfactual history: that produced by the historian, 
and that produced by the maker of fiction.   
The historian’s counterfactual history is a thought experiment that helps historians 
to better understand factual history.  It tests the significance of historical events by 
imagining a world in which a particular event did not happen or happened differently, 
and in doing so, emphasizes “the precariousness of certain historical situations” (Doležel 
266).  Despite foregrounding the random factors that decide many historical outcomes, 
the historian’s counterfactual history does not actually question or challenge factual 
history.  The maker of fiction’s counterfactual history, by contrast, “is a parody of classic 
historical fiction” (Doležel 267) that self-reflexively makes use of historical characters 
and situations for its “carnivalization” (McHale cited in Doležel 267). 
This sweeping generalization assumes that all fiction writers who make use of 
counterfactual histories in their writing have a postmodernist agenda, one whose primary 
objective is to play with the boundary between fiction making and historiography.  
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Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, with its imaginative presentation of a world in which World 
War II was followed by the invention and institutionalization of human cloning, is an 
example of a fiction maker’s counterfactual history. Yet Never Let Me Go is not a 
parody; it does not mock history, but instead invites its readers to heed its lessons 
cautiously.  Of course, this is not to say that Never Let Me Go has no interest in 
postmodernism.  As I argue in my first chapter, the novel acts as a postmodern rewrite of 
classic dystopian fiction.  Arguably, however, the function of the novel’s postmodern 
rewrite, and indeed the function of the novel’s counterfactual history, is not to critique 
historiography, but rather to critique modern society itself.  In other words, Ishiguro’s 
counterfactual history works as a thought experiment; it lays out the possible 
consequences of a single historical alteration, critically evaluates those consequences, and 
shows how easily these possibilities could come to fruition in the actual world. 
Doležel argues that the historian’s counterfactual history works as a thought 
experiment in that it tests the significance of a historical event by presenting a world in 
which that event happened differently or did not happen at all (266).  In Never Let Me 
Go, the historical alteration occurs in the post-1945 scientific community; according to 
the novel’s counterfactual history, this age of scientific experimentation leads to the 
invention of human cloning.  All of the novel’s subsequent deviations from history stem 
from this single alteration.  As the novel slowly reveals the details of its counterfactual 
world, the effects of this alteration—both positive and negative—come into view.  For 
example, the clones, who in large numbers constitute a huge repository of organs, 
become an invaluable resource to the medical field.  On the other hand, the clones 
themselves are subject to horrible mistreatment and human rights violations, the worst of 
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which, we learn, are not even revealed to Kathy and the rest of the clones from Hailsham, 
a school whose own guidelines for the treatment of clones are relatively benign. 
Doležel points out that although historians use counterfactual history as a thought 
experiment, their use of this discourse mode “is not arbitrary; it can be critically 
evaluated” (267).  In Never Let Me Go, Ishiguro critically evaluates his counterfactual 
history by giving different weight to the positive and negative consequences of the 
existence of cloning.  The novel, which focuses almost exclusively on the lives of clones, 
highlights the atrocities of their treatment.  Kathy’s recollection of the deaths of Ruth and 
Tommy, for instance, underscores the cruelty of the system that denies the clones the 
ability to have long-lasting relationships.  This is further emphasized by the clones’ 
inability to escape the system, as I discuss in my second chapter.  Miss Emily’s revelation 
that “we’ve given you better lives than you would have otherwise” (Ishiguro 265) further 
stresses these atrocities; Ishiguro suggests that the reader does not even know the worst of 
the situation.   The positive consequences, which Miss Emily explains to the clones at the 
end of the novel, only serve to underscore the negatives: “How can you ask a world that 
has come to regard cancer as curable, how can you ask such a world to put away that 
cure, to go back to the dark days” (Ishiguro 263).  Here, Ishiguro suggests that the 
benefits afforded by the invention of cloning has caused the non-cloned population to 
turn a blind eye to the grossly unethical treatment of the clones.  By weighing the costs 
and benefits of his counterfactual history, Ishiguro demonstrates how crucial it is that 
human cloning did not actually become an accepted practice. 
In defining the historian’s counterfactual history as thought experiment, Doležel 
points out the importance of particularity: unless “counterfactual history focuses on 
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simple yes/no situations… the whole enterprise loses interpretive power and interest” 
(266).  When the counterfactual world’s differences from the actual world become too 
elaborate, the counterfactual history often “reads like a fantastic story” (Doležel 267).  
Ishiguro’s novel does not feel fantastical.  Indeed, as I discussed in my first chapter, part 
of what makes the novel so haunting is its familiarity.  Although the effects of the 
invention of cloning are far-reaching, they are measurable, and they do not branch off in 
ways that make the world of the novel unknowable.  The late-twentieth-century England 
of the novel, for example, feels a lot like the late-twentieth-century England of the actual 
world; major cities are divided by miles of open country, Norfolk is a county in the East, 
and popular music is distributed on cassette tape.  As Marie-Laure Ryan lays out in her 
description of the principle of minimal departure, we fill in the gaps of the storyworld 
with knowledge of our own world.  Given that the novel’s only marked difference is the 
existence of cloning, the world feels very familiar. 
Doležel argues that the historian’s counterfactual history emphasizes “the 
precariousness of certain historical situations” (266).  The striking similarity of the 
storyworld of Never Let Me Go to the actual world suggests that the actual world is 
dangerously close to the ethical nightmare found in the novel.  Considering the recent 
development of cloning technologies similar to those found in the novel, the 
precariousness of our current situation becomes all the more palpable.   
Doležel’s exploration of counterfactual history as a liminal space between fiction 
making and historiography provides a helpful framework for analyzing the overlap 
between fiction and history in Never Let Me Go.  Ishiguro’s novel, however, challenges 
Doležel’s assertion that all fictional counterfactual histories engage in a postmodernist 
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dismantling of the border between fiction and history.  Far from being a parody, the 
counterfactual history of Never Let Me Go functions as a thought experiment, an exercise 
which Doležel reserves for historians.  In the world of Ishiguro’s novel, a single deviation 
from factual history—the invention and widespread use of human cloning—leads to 
horrific consequences, including gross violations of human rights.  Despite these far-
reaching consequences, the world of Never Let Me Go feels quite similar to our own.  
The familiarity of the storyworld, coupled with Ishiguro’s critical evaluation of the 
consequences of his counterfactual history, serves not only to illustrate how dangerous 
such an invention would have been, but also how easily it could come to fruition.  
Ultimately, Ishiguro’s use of counterfactual history as thought experiment demonstrates 
how fiction makers can blend elements of fictional and factual worlds not to blur the lines 
between the two, but to better understand the significance of history and what it can tell 
us about the future. 
In defending the boundary between fictional and factual discourse from the 
postmodernist attempts to erase it, scholars like Cohn, Ryan, and Doležel have seemingly 
taken the debate to its other extreme, arguing for a hard and fast boundary between the 
two types of discourse.  Borderline cases, they argue, only serve to strengthen this 
distinction.  I contend that each of my three case studies resides in a liminal space 
between fictional and factual narrative in a way that these scholars’ models do not 
account for.  I do not argue that attempts to map out a boundary between fictional and 
factual narratives constitute a fruitless endeavor, but instead that, in drawing our 
narratological maps, we must consider how contemporary examples of experimental 
storytelling play with the boundary in question.  By analyzing areas of overlap between 
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fictional and factual narrative, we can better understand not only what distinguishes one 
type of discourse from the other, but also what happens when fictional and factual worlds 
collide. 
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Conclusion 
This study seeks to open up new lines of communication between contemporary 
narrative theory and contemporary narrative practice.  By analyzing contemporary 
examples of experimental storytelling in light of existing theories of narrative, I highlight 
the way establishing a dialogue of this sort can benefit both parties: not only do current 
theories help to illuminate key aspects of my case studies, but also careful engagement 
with the case studies produces new questions about narrative, questions that invite us to 
expand and enrich existing frameworks for narrative inquiry.  As I hope to have shown, 
our understanding of issues of intertextuality, rereading and reader response, and the 
interplay among fictional and factual worlds can benefit greatly from considering existing 
accounts of these aspects of narrative in light of the ever-growing corpus of stories at our 
disposal.   
Thus, the ultimate goal of this thesis is not just to build upon existing work on 
narrative theory, but also to pave the way for even further work on these and other 
dimensions of narrative, especially in light of contemporary narrative experimentation.  
Some of these narratives, like Atonement and Never Let Me Go, subvert classic narrative 
conventions in ways that scholars of narrative have not yet accounted for.  Others, like 
Fun Home, invite us to consider how existing theories of narrative must be expanded in 
order to account for the affordances and constraints of various storytelling media and the 
genres, such as graphic memoir, that those media accommodate.  My project also 
generates larger questions about the specific narrative issues that are its focus; for 
instance, how does taking into account the differences between an initial reading and a 
subsequent reading affect our understanding of other issues of narrative?  Is the process 
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of rereading also affected by adaptations of a story across media?  Does intertextuality 
work differently across media?  What happens when additional layers of embedded 
recentering are encountered in a narrative?  By seeking out new examples of 
experimental storytelling and considering how key narratological issues are at play in 
these narratives, we can attempt to answer these questions, as we further refine and enrich 
our understanding of narrative itself.  
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